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How the FTC Could Beat Google  
 
Robert H. Lande & Jonathan L. Rubin1 
 
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is rumored to be deciding whether to bring 
a “pure Section 5” case against Google as a result of complaints that the company unfairly favors 
its own offerings over those of its rivals in its search results. If successful, the case could do more 
than improve competition in the crucial multi-billion dollar online marketplace. It also could 
revitalize Section 5 of the FTC Act and solidify the agency’s authority to prevent the  “unfair 
methods of competition” or “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” that do not violate the other 
Antitrust or Consumer Protection statutes. But the case will fail miserably at the hands of a 
reviewing court and the agency will be confined to relatively non-controversial enforcement 
violations if the FTC fails to impose upon itself a tightly bounded and constrained legal 
framework that contains clear limiting principles. 
As former FTC Chairman Bill Kovacic recently warned, an unbounded Section 5 case will 
never be sustained by a reviewing court. He is correct. The FTC’s 2008 N-Data settlement, for 
example, would have been overturned if it had reached the appellate court because its Section 5 
formulation was without constraining principles. There is clear Supreme Court precedent 
holding that the FTC Act is broader than the other antitrust laws and covers incipient violations 
and conduct violating even the “spirit” of, or policies underlying, the other antitrust laws. 
Nevertheless, the only way a court will allow the FTC to pursue a pure Section 5 theory against 
Google would be if the agency constrains itself with a coherent principle of competitive harm: the 
consumer choice framework. 
The consumer choice framework focuses on actual or potential choice in the marketplace 
and the key factors necessary for markets to function competitively. This means that any 
complaint against Google should expressly declare that Section 5 violations are limited to two 
types of conduct:  
1. Conduct that does or will significantly restrict or distort the choices available to 
consumers, such as incipient exclusive dealing or other exclusionary strategies that 
materially restrict the array of alternatives on the market; or 
2. Conduct that significantly distorts consumers’ ability freely to choose among the 
alternatives the market provides, such as deceptively presented search results. 
This approach confines Section 5 within the bounds of the two traditional responsibilities of the 
FTC: antitrust law and consumer protection law. Another advantage of a consumer choice 
framework, moreover, is that it offers a coherent theory of anticompetitive harm flexible enough 
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to accommodate conduct that has elements of both an antitrust violation and a consumer 
protection violation. 
Under the consumer choice framework, non-price issues that consumers care about—not 
just price, but also variety, quality, privacy, and innovation—play a much more prominent role in 
the analysis and result. But the key advantage of a consumer choice approach is its limiting 
principles. For example, not every decrease in choice qualifies as an injury to competition. Only 
significant and material decreases count. Second, more choice is not necessarily good because too 
much choice can cause confusion and can, as a practical matter, mean costs increase unduly. The 
goal of competition policy should not be to maximize consumer choice, but only to eliminate 
practices that artificially restrict the choices the free market would have provided. Third, every 
antitrust violation reduces consumer choice, but not every reduction in consumer choice is an 
antitrust violation. 
Because the evidence against Google amassed by the FTC during its investigation is 
confidential we do not know whether the Commission ultimately will decide to pursue a pure 
Section 5 case or a traditional antitrust or consumer protection case, or both, against Google. Nor 
can we speculate whether a pure Section 5 case would be based upon conduct analogous to 
deception (if Google misrepresented the neutrality of its search results), incipient exclusive 
dealing (if consumers are unduly influenced but not required to use related Google products), or 
some other theory. Indeed, we cannot determine whether the evidence will demonstrate any type 
of law violation at all. 
Regardless, we urge the FTC to view its task as analogous to that of writing a 
Shakespearean sonnet in iambic pentameter, an approach that constrains the poet yet allows her 
to achieve greatness. If the Commission instead promulgates an approach to Section 5 that is 
insufficiently bounded, or gives it undue discretion, the relatively conservative reviewing courts 
of today are certain to dismiss its case against Google, and they might well restrict the scope of 
Section 5 to make it coterminous with the other antitrust laws. For the FTC to have any chance 
successfully to bring a pure Section 5 case against Google, it must impose upon itself the limits of 
the consumer choice framework. 
